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THE LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDER
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

When a man or woman wrongs another in any way, that person
must confess. He must make full restitution for his wrong, add
one-fifth to it and give it all to the person he has wronged.
Numbers 5:7
INTRODUCTION

The federal government shall be liable in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.I Why
then has Rodney Heitzenrater, rendered a quadriplegic due to the government's negligence, been forced to live without vital medical necessities even though he received a five million dollar judgment against the
United States? 2 This article will discuss the liability and responsibility of
the United States as mandated by Congress pursuant to the Federal Tort
3
Claims Act.
This paper is presented in the context of the case, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenraterv. United Stales, 4 recently decided by Judge Jim R. Carrigan of
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 5 In that
decision, Judge Carrigan awarded 6 Rodney over five million dollars,
much of which was for future medical services. 7 But Rodney has been
denied medical treatment while the government relitigates an issue that
would relieve it of this obligation. The government argues8 that the
United States should not have to pay that portion of the award which is
for future medical services. 9
The government's right to forego the payment of a monetary
1. This policy is found in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982)
[hereinafter FTCA or Act]. The FTCA states in part: "The United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." Id.
2. Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12,
1988).
3. See supra note 1.
4. See supra note 2.
5. By analyzing the government's responsibility in light of its effect on an actual victim of government negligence, the harsh realities of the government's evasive actions will
be most apparent.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982). In FTCA actions all trials are to the court. There is no
right to trial by jury. For an extensive discussion on the injustice resulting from this denial
see Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amendment
Right, 58 TEx. L. REV. 549 (1980).
7. See infra note 56 and accompanying test.
8. Defendant's Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 6-10, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
9. Id. The government contends that through the facilities of the Veterans' Administration ("VA") it has the means to supply those same medical services. This argument is
thoroughly analyzed in pp. 210-212.
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award, notwithstanding the language of the FTCA, will be analyzed in
light of Rodney's judgment and the forthcoming appeal to the Tenth
Circuit.' 0 This article begins with a general discussion of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, followed by the highlights of Rodney's particular circumstances. Other cases that have dealt with this issue will also be examined. The article includes a discussion of the pros and cons of
allowing the federal government to act in a manner and extent different
from that of a private individual. Finally, the article concludes with
some suggestions of how to compel the government to accept its legal
responsibilities under the FTCA.
I.

HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

For over 150 years, prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the United
States enjoyed legal immunity from the torts committed by its employees. I During this time, the sole remedy available to the victim of a federal government employee's negligent or wrongful act or omission was
relief by private bill.' 2 The individual would have to embark on a
lengthy and uncertain path of petitioning his local representative to introduce a bill that would grant him monetary relief. Hearings before
congressional committees were mandatory and the bill had to be passed
by both branches of the legislature.' 3 Because Congress was not well
equipped to evaluate and adjudicate these private matters, most of these
claims were never addressed or improperly investigated.14
Realizing that the judiciary and not Congress was the appropriate
body to handle the grievances of its citizenry, Congress, as early as 1832,
considered tort claims legislation.' 5 As could be expected, there was
strong opposition to a law that would waive sovereign immunity. 16
Some of the most vocal arguments included: the United States government has stepped into the shoes of the King of England, and it is universally accepted that the king can do no wrong; 17 the United States would
10. Judge Carrigan's Order was filed September 12, 1988. The Judgment was filed

September 13, 1988. The government's Notice of Appeal was docketed on November 17,
1988. It is expected that the appeal will be before the Tenth Circuit in 1989.
11. Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939). The Supreme Court described the government's freedom as "exceptional freedom from legal responsibility" for
the tortious acts of its employees. Id.
12. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979) defines "private bill" as
"[liegislation for the special benefit of an individual or a locality."
13. Mullins, Holding the Government Liable for its Torts: Payton v. United States, 13 U. TOL.
L. REV. 463, 468 (1982).
14. L.JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY: HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs, § 52 (1989) summarizingJudge William A. Richardson's first-hand observations as one of the early appointees to the Court of Claims.
15. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House judiciary Committee, 77th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 49 (1942).
16. Mullins at 464-467 discussing how the English doctrine of the divine rights of the
king was carried over and made applicable to the United States government.
17. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879), holding that the doctrine
that a king can do no wrong has no place in the United States where a democratic government has replaced the monarch.
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be degraded by appearing in the courts of its own creation;' 8 and there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law upon
which the right depends. 19
In 1855, Congress established the Court of Claims to hear claims
against the United States arising from United States contracts or federal
law. 20 It was another sixty years before Congress seriously considered a
comparable avenue of relief for tort claims. 2 1 As more and more citizens claimed injuries at the hands of negligent federal employees, Congress came under pressure to devise a tort claims bill. 22 Years of debate
over the appropriateness of waiving sovereign immunity culminated in
the summer of 1945. On the morning of July 28, 1945, an airplane
struck the Empire State Building killing and seriously injuring people
both in the building and on the streets. Extensive property damage also
resulted. The aircraft was a United States Army bomber piloted by a
23
serviceman who was flying too low.

The victims of this tragic accident were shocked to learn that there
was no judicial remedy to recover damages from the United States government. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provided an insurmountable barrier to relief.24 This tragedy may have been the impetus to

finally abolishing the doctrine, because twelve months later, on August
25
2, 1946, the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed.
The new law authorized federal district courts to adjudicate civil actions for money damages accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury
or loss of property caused by the tortious acts of government employees
while acting within the scope of their employment. Liability would be
imposed under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable in accordance with the law of the state where the act
occurred. 2 6 As previously discussed, one purpose of the Act was to re18. U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882), holding that the United States' ability to
function for the benefit of the people would not be impaired if it were to be sued in the
courts which it created.
19. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), affirming the impracticality
of a citizen suing the government for protection of a legal right when the government
makes the law upon which the legal right is based.
20. Plave, United States v. Varig Airlines: The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of Government

Liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 197, 202 n.18 (1985).
21. Id. at 202.
22. Jayson, supra note 15, § 52.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 2671-80 (1982)).
26. The complete text of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) is:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and
after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
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lieve Congress of its burden of private relief bills. 27 The other purpose
was to do justice to those who had suffered injuries or losses through the
28
wrongs of government employees.
At the time of the enactment of the FTCA, existing precedent
strictly construed statutes under which the government consented to
suit in favor of the sovereign. 2 9 Changing times, however, saw the need
for changing attitudes. Several years prior to the adoption of the FTCA,
the Supreme Court indicated that it was backing away from strict construction in favor of a more liberal interpretation of governmental immunity waivers. 3 0 In United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., l the
Court expressly rejected the rule of strict construction by allowing an
insurance company to sue in its own name under the Act on an assigned
claim.3 2 This was contrary to an anti-assignment statute which sharply
restricted the assignment of claims against the United States.3 3 By allowing this assigned claim to be brought under the FTCA, the Court
firmly established that the new law would be liberally construed.
We think that the Congressional attitude in passing the Tort
Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's
statement [that] . . . "[t]he exemption of the sovereign from
suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construc'3 4
tion, where consent has been announced."
Other Supreme Court cases followed this liberal interpretation.3 5
In United States v. Brown,3 6 the Supreme Court allowed a claim by a vetIt is interesting to note that this legislation, though enacted in 1946, provided relief
for claims occurring on and after January 1, 1945, thereby including claims from the July
28, 1945 crash.
27. See supra notes 13-16.
28. HearingsBefore theJoint Committee on the Organizationof Congress, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
67-69 (1945).
29. Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U.S. 244, 250 (1935). See also Eastern
Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 (1972); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584 (1941).
30. "[W]e start from the premise that such waivers by Congress of governmental immunity in case of such federal instrumentalities should be liberally construed. This policy
is in line with the current disfavor of the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit, as
evidenced by the increasing tendency of Congress to waive the immunity where federal
governmental corporations are concerned." F.H.A. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940).
31. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
32. Id. at 380, the court acknowledged the broad sweep of the FTCA in imposing
upon the United States private person liability.
33. Id. at 370. The anti-assignment statute construed in Aetna provided that "[a]ll
transfers and assignments ... made of any claim upon the United States, or any part or
share thereof, or interest therein ... shall be absolutely null and void .... 31 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1976). This language no longer appears in the present version of the statute at 31
U.S.C. § 3727 (1982). Today, "an assignment may be made only after a claim is allowed,
the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued." Id.
34. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 383 (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140,
147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926)).
35. For one example see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), where the
Court, utilizing a liberal construction, interpreted the term "any claim" to allow the claim
of an off-duty soldier caused by the negligent driving of an on-duty soldier.
36. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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eran who was negligently treated in a Veterans Administration hospital.
The Court departed from the Feres doctrine3 7 in ruling that since the
claim was based on an injury which had not occurred in the course of
military duty, it was actionable under the FTCA.3 8 In Feres the Court
recognized that servicemen's benefit statutes provide generous compensation 3 9 so additional compensation under the FTCA is duplicative.
The Brown Court took the opposite position, commenting that since
Congress had not pronounced a doctrine of exclusiveness or election of
remedies in the Tort Claims Act, it would not do so. 40 This liberal interpretation of the FTCA insured that liability was imposed on the government "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
' 41
under like circumstances.
The term "private individual," referred to above, was defined in
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States.4 2 In Rayonier, the plaintiff alleged that employees of the United States Forest Service acted negligently while fighting a fire, resulting in the destruction of the plaintiff's timber, buildings,
and other property. The Supreme Court held that giving the FTCA its
plain and natural meaning, the United States is liable to the plaintiff for
the Forest Service's negligence if state law would impose liability on private persons or corporations under similar circumstances. 43 Additionally, the United States has been treated as a "private individual" for
44
impleader purposes.
The term "under like circumstances" was given a liberal interpretation, contrary to the government's position, in Indian Towing Co. v. United
States.4 5 In Indian Towing, the plaintiff claimed damage to a vessel and
cargo when the vessel was grounded due to the Coast Guard's negligence in maintaining a lighthouse. The government argued that maintenance of a lighthouse was a "uniquely governmental activity" 46 for
37. In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Court barred a negligence
claim by a serviceman. It declared that American law has never permitted a soldier to
recover, against either his superior officers or the government, for negligence; in other
words, there is no analogous private individual liability. Id. at 141. See also Abney, Suing
Uncle Sam in Tort, 5 CAL. LAw. 31, 33-34 (1985).
38. "[U]nlike the claims in the Feres case, this one is not foreign to the broad pattern
of liability which the United States undertook by the Tort Claims Act." Brown, 348 U.S. at
112.
39. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145.
40. Brown, 348 U.S. at Il1.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
42. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
43. Id. at 318. The Court emphasized that the government's liability was not to be
measured by that of municipal corporation or other public body. Id. at 319. This obviated
the need to consider whether the government acted in a proprietary or uniquely governmental capacity.
44. See United States v. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543 (1951), where the Supreme Court
treated the United States as a private individual and allowed it to be impleaded as a joint
tortfeasor.
45. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
46. Simply stated, the "uniquely governmental activity" doctrine insulates the government from liability where its activities are solely governmental without a corresponding
activity in the private sector. This is so because the FTCA imposes liability on the government as it would on a private individual. The government reasoned that if there were no
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which there was no private counterpart, thus liability could not be imposed. 4 7 The Court held otherwise. It interpreted the Act to impose
liability on the United States under "like circumstances," not under the
same circumstances. 4 8 The Court went on to say that when the government undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance, it must perform its good samaritan task in a careful manner or
49
answer in damages.
The actual language of the FTCA, in addition to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Act, establishes that the United States is to
be placed in the same position, for liability purposes, as private parties,
individual or corporate. That is not to say, however, that the United
States completely waived its sovereign immunity; it did reserve by statute thirteen specific exceptions to liability 50 in addition to the judicially
private individual engaging in the activity, there could be no liability imposed on the government. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64-65.
47. Id. at 65.
48. Id. at 68-69.
49. Id. at 69. The Court refused to distinguish between a good samaritan task performed by the government and an individual. When the government undertakes such a
task, the FTCA imposes the same duty of care on the government as exists on an individual. Id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) states:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to -

(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission
of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or
customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790
of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a
quarantine by the United States.
(g) Repealed.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out
of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to
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created Feres doctrine. 5 '
Tort actions under the FTCA have some important distinctions
from standard state tort actions. An injured plaintiff seeking to establish
liability and damages for the alleged tort of the government has no right
to a jury trial. 5 2 Instead, all trials are held before a United States DistrictJudge. 53 Additionally, a plaintiff cannot recover prejudgment interest 54 or punitive damages5 5 even though recoverable under state law.
With this understanding of the Federal Tort Claims Act, this article
turns to Rodney Heitzenrater's dilemma.
II.

THE CASE OF RODNEY HEITZENRATER

56

Rodney Heitzenrater was born on May 24, 1959. 5 7 At the age of 17
he enlisted in the United States Army. 58 By so serving, Rodney is entitled to use the Veterans' Administration ("VA") hospital facilities 5 9 and
60
to receive VA medical care.
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal
law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or
by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal
intermediate credit bank, or a bank for co-operatives.
For a detailed discussion of exception (a), the "discretionary function" exception, see
Rice, United States v. Varig. Can the King Only Do Little Wrongs?, 22 CAL. W.L. REV. 175
(1985).
51. See supra note 37. See also Heldman, Suing the United States Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 14 COLO. LAw. 1808, 1812 (1985).
52. See supra note 6.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 1.
55. Id. For a detailed discussion see, Sullivan, Defining Punitive Damages Under The Federal Tort Claims Act, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 251 (1984).
56. The information contained in this section, except where noted, is excerpted from
Judge Carrigan's Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
57. Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
58. Defendant's Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 2, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
59. 38 U.S.C. § 610 (1982) states:
The Administrator, within the limits of the Veterans' Administration facilities, may furnish hospital care or nursing home care which the Administrator determines is needed to (B) any veteran for a non-service-connected disability if such veteran is unable to defray the expenses of necessary hospital or nursing home care;
38 U.S.C. § 610(a)(1)(B) (1982).
60. 38 U.S.C. § 612 states:
Except as provided in subsection (b), the Administrator, within the limits of
Veterans' Administration facilities, may furnish such medical services as the Administrator finds to be reasonably necessary to any veteran for a service-connected disability. The Administrator may also furnish to any such veteran such
home health services as the Administrator finds to be necessary or appropriate
for the effective and economical treatment of such disability (including only such
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On May 26, 1983, Rodney was admitted to Denver Veterans' Ad6
ministration Center for treatment of an apparent psychotic condition. '
Shortly after admission he was left unsupervised in his room on the hospital's seventh floor. In response to his psychotic delusions, he broke
through the window screen and fell seventy feet to the ground, sus62
taining injuries which left him permanently disabled.
After the fall, Rodney was hospitalized at the Denver VA Medical
Center from May 26, 1983 to August 26, 1983. He was initially diagnosed as having thoracic spinal compression which rendered him paraplegic from the waist down. Traction was administered in an attempt to
free the locked vertebrae of the spine. This treatment, however, was
unsuccessful. Moreover, during treatment at the Denver facility several
complications developed. Shortly after the injury, an emergency tracheotomy tube was inserted. The kinking or plugging of this tube caused
respiratory arrest on three separate occasions. 63 Additionally, Rodney
developed gastro-intestinal problems which developed into an ulcer.
Pressure sores developed on his heels, legs, sacrum and coccyx. Due to
these and other problems, Rodney's weight dropped from 152 pounds
to 118 pounds. 64 Rodney's treatment at the Denver VA Medical Center
was, needless to say, less than a pleasant experience.
After three months at the Denver facility, Rodney was transferred
on August 25, 1983, to the Cleveland VA Medical Center, which specializes in the treatment of spinal injuries. 65 He was initially discharged on
March 30, 1984. During this time not only was treatment ineffective in
restoring any of Rodney's sensitivity or motor skills, 66 but in fact, his
67
condition worsened from paraplegia to quadriplegia.
Rodney was readmitted in February, 1985, with atrophied forearms,
hands, thighs, and legs. He was also experiencing a loss of sensation in
his hands. 68 In August, 1987, Rodney was diagnosed as having com69
plete motor and sensory paralysis.
Rodney is presently living in a mobile home in Pennsylvania with
his wife and three daughters aged eight, six, and five. 70 These living
improvements and structural alterations the cost of which does not exceed $2,500
(or reimbursement up to such amount) as are necessary to assure the continuation of treatment for such disability or to provide access to the home or to essential lavatory and sanitary facilities. In the case of any veteran discharged or
released from the active military, naval, or air service for a disability incurred or
aggravated in line of duty, such services may be so furnished for that disability,
whether or not service-connected for the purposes of this chapter.
38 U.S.C. § 612(a) (1982).
61. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 1-2,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 7.
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conditions impose extreme inconvenience, deprivation of privacy, and
limitation of treatment. Rodney's paralysis requires constant attention
for he cannot even turn himself when lying in bed. There is no question
that Rodney will be dependant on others for the remainder of his life. 7 1
On April 18, 1986, Rodney and his wife filed a claim against the
United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 7 2 On October 23, 1987, the government admitted liability
and causation. 73 The only issues presented at trial were the types and
74
amount of damages to be awarded.
A trial was held on June 27-29, 1988. 7 5 After considering all the
evidence, including the testimony of Rodney, his experts, and the government's experts, Judge Carrigan found that Rodney was seriously and
permanently disabled. 76 Damage awards were divided into two categories: those for Rodney and those for his wife. 7 7 The categories and
amounts are briefly summarized to give an understanding of exactly
what damages the government disputes. It is noteworthy that almost 90
percent of the damages awarded are fully consistent with the recommendations of the government's advisory witness, John E. Dahlberg, 78 a
quadriplegic with a Master's degree in vocational rehabilitation. In addition to his testimony at trial, Mr. Dahlberg prepared a report, relied
upon by Judge Carrigan, entitled "Anticipated Annual Medical and Re' 79
habilitation Expenses - Rodney Heitzenrater.
The categories and amounts awarded by Judge Carrigan are as
follows: 80
1) Future medicines and supplies - $267,326;
2) Durable
medical
equipment
and
transportation
- $270,812;
3) One-time medical needs for spinal cord and tendon injury
- $51,252;
4) Future medical care and evaluations - $150,495;
5) One-time medical emergency fund - $65,000;
6) Daytime nursing aide, attendant and household services $2,111,022;
7) Home modifications - $22,000;
71.

Id.

72. See Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
73. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 2, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
74. Id. at 1.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 7-8. This article focuses on the damages awarded Rodney because the damages awarded his wife are not contested by the government within the context of this

article.
78. Id. at 9.
79. Id.
80. In computing the amounts, Judge Carrigan used the United States Life Tables to
ascertain Rodney's life expectancy of 43.9 years. All amounts which were computed for
the lifetime expectancy were discounted to a present value.
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Therapy, rehabilitation, counseling and related services $81,970;
9) Recreation and leisure expenses - $27,489;
10) Loss of past income - $34,624;
11) Loss of future income - $603,557;
12) Pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life - $2,000,000;
Total awarded: $5,685,502.81
8)

III.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

The government's argument that it should not have to pay the cost
of future medical services and supplies by offering instead, the use of the
Veterans' Administration's facilities has already been decided in two
other cases. An understanding of this controlling precedent will demonstrate the folly and resulting injustice of the government's argument.
In Feely v. United States8 2 the material facts are similar to those in
Rodney's case. Like Rodney, Donald Feely was a veteran of the armed
forces, 8 3 and therefore entitled to free medical care and treatment pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 610 and 612.84 Additionally, Donald availed himself of these services on several occasions.
While working for the city of Philadelphia, Donald was struck by a
postal truck driven by an employee of the federal government, causing
injury to his right leg and knee.8 5 The trial court found the government
negligent and awarded Donald, as part of his recovery, $12,000 for future psychiatric medical expenses.8 6 The government argued, on appeal, that this part of the award was error because Donald had made use
of the free government hospital and medical facilities in the past and
would continue to in the future. If Donald chose to avail himself of the
free psychiatric care from the Veterans' Administration, the government
would be forced to pay twice for his future care.87
The Third Circuit upheld the trial court's award, dismissing the
government's argument. It found that accepting the government's position would result in forcing Donald, financially speaking, to seek only
the available public assistance. 88 Donald would have to pay for any private medical care. The court reasoned that this would be an unconscionable burden to place on a successful plaintiffs 9 The victim of
another's tort is entitled to choose, within reasonable limits, his own
doctor and treatment facility. Forcing the victim to choose between accepting public aid or bearing the expense of his own rehabilitation is an
81. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 11-23,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
82. 337 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964).
83. Id. at 926.
84. See supra notes 59 and 60.
85. See Feely, 337 F.2d at 926.
86. Feely v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 718, 720 (E.D. Penn. 1963).
87. Feely v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 934 (3d Cir. 1964).
88.

Id.

89. Id. at 935.
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unreasonable choice. 90
The court went on to say that there are many reasons why Donald
may have chosen not to accept the VA offer. He could feel that the public facilities are inferior; that a private physician is superior; or that because of over-crowded conditions at the VA center, he may not receive
timely care. 9 1 The fact that Donald made use of the free government
services in the past did not mean he would do so in the future. 92 Without adequate funds, Donald would not have the privilege of choice.
With the funds he could choose the care he prefers. The court said
93
Donald had the right to make the choice.
The court noted the government might have to pay twice for Donald's injuries, should he decide to seek care after receiving an award. 9 4
The court said this factor should not be a consideration in awarding
damages under the FTCA. It is a policy decision which should be made
95
in the administration of veterans' benefits.
Simply put, the Third Circuit held that the United States is responsible for payment of a judgment in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual. This is precisely what the FTCA mandates. Congress, when it enacted the FTCA, was aware that certain individuals could receive free benefits from the VA, 96 yet it chose not to
require the plaintiff to elect a remedy. 9 7 Therefore, if such a choice is to
be required, it is Congress, not the courts which must do so. 98
Twenty years after Feely a similar situation arose in Powers v. United
States. 9 9 Robert Powers was a World War II veteran of the United States
Army. ' 00 This entitled him to free medical care provided by the VA.1 0 '
In 1971, Robert slipped and fell on a patch of ice.' 0 2 Due to resulting
neck pain, Robert entered the VA hospital in Newington, Connecticut.
After diagnosis and consultations, surgery was performed to fuse together bones of his cervical column, eliminating the excessive motion
and dislocation thought to be causing the pain.10 3 As a result of negligent treatment, Robert was left partially paralyzed in his upper
extremities. 104
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

94. Id.
95. Id.

96. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
97. In Brooks, the Court allowed a serviceman to recover damages under the FTCA for
injuries sustained when the automobile he was riding in was negligently struck by an army
truck driven by a serviceman, even though the injured party was entitled to benefits for the
injury under other statutes. "[T]here is nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the veterans'
laws which provide for exclusiveness of remedy." id. at 53.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.

589 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Conn. 1984).
Id. at 1089.
See supra notes 59 and 60.
Powers, 589 F. Supp. at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1095.
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As in Feely, the government argued that if the plaintiff were to make
use of the available VA medical services, he would be receiving both free
treatment as well as the monetary value of that treatment. In awarding
damages for future medical treatment the Powers court dealt directly with
the problem of a double payment by the government, i.e., the tort damages awarded may be compensating Robert for medical treatment which
10 5
he could potentially receive gratis from the VA.
The court decided not to offset any possible future medical benefits
from a monetary award. The court reasoned that this would, as a practical matter, unduly limit and virtually predetermine not only the kind of
medical care necessary for the treatment of Robert's condition, but also
the source of the medical care. 10 6 This predetermination would be burdensome because Donald could not receive nursing-home care or undergo outside surgical procedures without the approval of a VA
physician. This predetermination, moreover, would be especially onerous if it were to force Donald to undergo treatment at a VA facility
whose sister facility caused him to suffer the very injury for which he
10 7
now needs treatment.
As in Feely, the Powers court concluded with the observation that
congressional action is the appropriate means of not only eliminating
the windfall conundrum which confronts and concerns federal courts
under these, or similar circumstances, but also protecting the federal
treasury from the threat of an unnecessary double payment for the same
injury.' 0 8 The holdings in both of these cases are consistent with the
spirit and interpretation of that part of the FTCA which imposes liability
on the government in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances. 0 9
IV.

THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT HAS No LEGAL BASIS

The government seeks to avoid paying that portion of Rodney's
award which it can provide through the services and facilities of the Veterans' Administration."l 0 In support of its position, the government relies on cases which discuss the Collateral Source Rule."' In order to
understand the government's argument, a brief discussion of the Collateral Source Rule is presented.
A.

The Collateral Source Rule
The Collateral Source Rule, in federal tort claims litigation, has a

105. Id. at 1108.
106. Id. at 1108 (quoting Feely v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 934-35 (3d. Cir. 1964)).
107. Id. at 1108.
108. Id. at 1108-09.
109. See supra notes 1 and 26.
110. The government's position is set forth in its Proposed Findings of Fact and Trial
Brief at 6-10, Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept.
12, 1988).
111. The fact that the cises relied upon by the government discuss the Collateral
Source Rule indicates that these cases are inapposite.
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common meaning. Because the FTCA requires federal district courts to
use the law of the state where the tort occurred it is appropriate, in this
2
situation, to examine Colorado's Collateral Source Rule.l"
Colorado courts have interpreted this rule to mean that, "compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not
contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from
the wrongdoer.""11 3 Thus, a collateral source is one which is distinct
from the funds of the defendant. 1 4 In the context of an FTCA suit, an
injured party who has already been compensated for his or her injuries
can also recover damages from the United States, unless the source of
the original compensation was funds provided by the United States." 15
The Tenth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to consider
the application of the collateral source rule in an FTCA action. In United
States v. Gray, 116 the court held that an award under the FTCA should be
reduced by the monthly payments that the plaintiff would receive pursuant to service disability benefit statutes."17 The holding in Gray was just
and logical. The government should not have to pay twice for its single
tort. 118

The Collateral Source Rule developed an interesting wrinkle when
a plaintiff, suing under the FTCA, claimed that social security benefits
19
were collateral to an award under the Act. In Steckler v. United States,
the plaintiff sought and obtained a favorable court awarded judgment
based on the medical malpractice of the VA hospital in Denver.120 The
hospital staff neglected to recognize and treat a lack of blood circulation
21
in the plaintiff's legs, resulting in amputation of his left leg.'
The trial court rejected the plaintiff's argument that social security
benefits were collateral to an FTCA award.' 2 2 The Tenth Circuit reversed this finding and held social security disability payments to be col123
lateral to, and therefore recoverable in addition to, an FTCA award.
112. See supra note 26.
113. Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545, 481 P.2d 722, 724 (1971)).
114. Berg, 806 F.2d at 984.
115. Id.
116. 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952).
117. Id. at 244. The court found the service disability payments to be a non-collateral
source to the FTCA award, since the source of both funds was the United States. Citing
United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949), the Gray court refused to allow
plaintiff a double recovery.
118. In Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949),just three years after the enactment of the FTCA, the Court stated, "we now see no indication that Congress meant the
United States to pay twice for the same injury."
119. 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
120. Id. at 1373. The plaintiff argued that since the source of social security payments
was from his and his employer's contributions, they were collateral to the government's
funds. Id. at 1375.
121. Id. at 1373.
122. Id. at 1375.
123. Id. at 1379. The court stated:
There is a dearth of authority on whether Social Security disability payments are
to be regarded as income from a collateral source insofar as they represent pay-
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The court reasoned that the Social Security Fund is comprised, for the
most part, from funds contributed by individual workers and their
24
employers. '
The holdings of Brooks, Gray, and Steckler teach us that a plaintiff
cannot receive a double monetary recovery from the United States for a
single injury, unless the injured plaintiff has contributed to a fund from
which he seeks compensation. The government attempts to place Rodney Heitzenrater in a category of plaintiffs that receives double compensation for their injuries from non-collateral sources. This is an incorrect
analogy since Rodney is seeking a single monetary recovery under the
FTCA, and not looking for additional service disability or social security
benefits.
B.

The Government's Legal Confusion

With this understanding of the Collateral Source Rule, we now analyze the government's argument and how the facts in Rodney's case
demonstrate that the government should be required to pay the award.
The government argues that hospital benefits under 28 U.S.C. § 610125
and medical benefits under 28 U.S.C. § 612126 are non-collateral to an
award under the FTCA since Rodney has not contributed to either
fund. 12 7 These cases are now analyzed.
In Berg v. United States, 128 Philip Berg, a 73 year old retired colonel
from the United States Army was admitted to Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center after complaining of dizziness. A cerebral angiogram was ordered to confirm a suspected brain tumor. Negligence by the United
States in performing the angiogram caused Mr. Berg to suffer a stroke
resulting in his blindness. 129 Mr. Berg sought Medicare benefits in addition to the FTCA award.' 30 In deciding whether Medicare benefits
were collateral to an FTCA recovery, the Berg court distinguished between benefits that come from unfunded, general revenues of the
United States (deductible) and those that come from "a special fund
supplied in part by the beneficiary or a relative upon whom the benefit is
dependent (nondeductible)."' 13 ' The court found that Medicare benements made by the injured person and his employer. Logically they are collateral. We do know that the government has supplemented the fund from time to

time where this has been necessary. The extent to which the payments under
Social Security disability can be traced to the government is questionable. The
part contributed by the worker and the employers has the aspects of social insurance and as such is collateral to monies contributed by the government.
Id.
124. Id. at 1379.
125. See supra note 59.
126. See supra note 60.
127. Defendant's. Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 8, Heitzenrater &
Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
128. 806 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 982-83.
130. Id. at 984.
131. Id. (quoting from United States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.
1960) (emphasis in original)).
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fits are a collateral source being funded by the same employment tax
1 32
scheme that funded the social security disability benefits in Steckler.
Thus, Mr. Berg was entitled to both the federal tort claims award and
33
the medicare benefits.'
The United States next cites Mays v. United States,' 3 4 a companion
case to Berg. In Mays, the Tenth Circuit was faced with deciding whether
benefits received from the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services ("CHAMPUS") are a collateral source to an FTCA
award.' 3 5 The Mays court found that, "[a]ll of the money for the
CHAMPUS program comes from the general treasury of the United
States; no money is paid directly into the fund by the recipients of
CHAMPUS benefits."' 3 6 The court found CHAMPUS benefits to be
noncollateral to the funds of an FTCA award. Since both the Federal
Tort Claims award and the CHAMPUS benefits derived from the unfunded general revenues of the United States, the plaintiff was entitled
to only a single recovery.
In Steckler v. United States,' 3 7 the court decided that social security
benefits are collateral to the extent that the injured party contributed to
that fund' 3 8 while veterans' benefits are unquestionably a non-collateral
source which is deductible from an award in that it is derived entirely
from government funds and cannot be claimed to originate in any collateral contribution.' 3 9 In each of these cases the plaintiff sought monetary compensation from a government funded program in addition to an
award under the FTCA. By citing these cases, the government attempts
to equate the receipt of money, as compensation for injury under the
veterans' program, with the offer of services under that program.
The government also argues that it would be paying a punitive damage award "when Rodney avails himself of VA benefits, but has been
awarded money to pay for that care in a private setting."' 40 The government's presumption that Rodney will avail himself of VA benefits
cannot be taken for granted.
V.

THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED To PAY THE JUDGMENT

Rodney's position is supported by caselaw, the words and interpretation of the FTCA, as well as common sense. The Feely court stated that
a victim of another's tort is entitled to choose, within reason, his own
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Hayashi, 282 F.2d at 603.
Berg, 806 F.2d at 985-86.
806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 977.
549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1379.
Id. (citing Gray v. United States, 199 F.2d 239, 244 (10th Cir. 1952)).
Defendant's Proposed Finding of Fact and Trial Brief at 10, Heitzenrater &

Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988). The United States
relies on Burke v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 981, 994 (D. Md. 1985), a case which disallowed the plaintiff a double recovery.
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doctor and treatment facility.' 4 1 In dealing with the uncertainty of a
potential recovery, the Powers court stated that a "trial court must deal
with [the uncertainty of a double recovery] as it deals with other uncertainties by using its best judgment after all the facts and circumstances
14 2
of the case have been taken into consideration."'
In dealing with the uncertainty of a double recovery in Rodney's
case, Judge Carrigan found ample evidence at trial demonstrating Rodney's disappointment with, and distrust of, his treatment at the Denver
VA Medical Center. 14 3 It is for this reason that Judge Carrigan stated
that a private defendant cannot escape an award of damages in a civil
suit for future medical expenses by contending that a plaintiff, who happens to be a veteran, is entitled to free medical care at a VA Medical
Center.14 4 There is no reason why the federal government, having admitted negligence, should not be subject to the same rules governing a
private individual, 14 5 as mandated by the FTCA. 146 Common sense requires that Rodney not be forced to return to the tortfeasor who caused
his quadriplegia, for treatment of that condition.
VI.

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to show how Congress has removed the federal government's cloak of sovereign immunity, thereby
requiring the United States to account for its negligence. The plain
meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act, along with the Feely and Powers
decisions, as well as common sense, require fault to be imposed on the
United States in the same manner it is imposed on individuals. In Rodney Heitzenrater's situation, the federal government must pay the award
as any "private individual" would. The offer of services in lieu of money
is an unacceptable alternative. Since individuals are not entitled to this
barter exchange it should not be available to the government.
One commentator states that "[tihe Act as a whole is an example perhaps a rare one - of a statute that generally achieves its intended
purpose."' 1 4 7 If the United States is permitted to deprive Rodney of his
choice of private medical care, then the Act will not achieve its intended
148
purpose of "doing justice."
By attempting to provide medical services in lieu of paying the
award, the federal government seeks to be treated differently than a private individual. If the government is to be treated differently, it should
141. Feely v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 935 (3d Cir. 1964).
142. Powers v. United States 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1108 (D. Conn. 1984) (quoting United
States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1949)).
143. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 14, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
144.
145.

Id.
Id.

146. See supra notes 1 and 26.
147. Axelrad, Litigation Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8

LrTIGATION

22, 55 (1981).

148. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.

67-69 (1945).
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be required to right its wrong in a way that would expand rather than
curtail Rodney's freedom of medical choice, expediting his
rehabilitation.
Justice delayed is justice denied. In light of Feely and Powers, the
government should not be permitted to delay paying the award. Acknowledging that both parties have a right to appeal a trial court's findings, this article proposes a compromise.
The 5.6 million dollar award was based on Rodney's life expectancy
of 43.9 years. 14 9 On a yearly basis this breaks down to approximately
$128,000. In light of the government's admission of liability, 15 0 and Mr.
Dahlberg's recommendation as to the appropriate amounts recoverable, 15 1 a reasonable compromise would be for the government to provide this annual amount during the pendency of its appeal.' 5 2 This
would allow Rodney to begin receiving rehabilitation treatment, choosing his own doctors and facilities. If the Tenth Circuit decides to allow
the government to provide services in lieu of paying the award, the government will have paid a minimal amount. But more importantly, Rod153
ney could receive treatment immediately.
Fortunately, there is another remedy already available to Rodney.
If a "private attorney" signs a pleading without obtaining information
necessary to support it, he or she may be forced to pay the opposing
party's legal fees. 1 54 Congress has deemed it equitable that the United
States likewise be disciplined for signing frivolous pleadings. The Equal
Access to Justice Act' 5 5 imposes liability on the United States for reasonable legal fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party
would be liable. Acknowledging the precedent set by Feely and Powers,
the Tenth Circuit may find that the government's appeal is indeed frivolous. If so, the government would be liable for Rodney's legal fees and
expenses in defending the appeal. Such a remedy would not expedite
149. Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 6, Heitzenrater
& Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
150. Id. at 2 Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 2,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
151. Id. at 9 Memorandum Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 9,
Heitzenrater & Heitzenrater v. United States, No. 86-C-757 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 1988).
152. This compromise solution is offered only because of the strong precedent established by Feely and Powers. If this issue had not already been decided, then the government
would have the right to appeal as any "private individual" would, without having to make
any payment.
153. Under this comprise, Rodney could stipulate not to avail himself of the free VA
services while receiving the annual payments, thereby preventing any double recovery.
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982) states:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and
expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the
United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her
official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States
shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party
would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which
specifically provides for such an award.
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Rodney's access to badly needed treatment. But the delay, caused by
frivolous pleadings, could at least be compensated for monetarily.
In conclusion, the federal government of the United States exists to
serve the people. The only way the government can serve in a fair and
just manner is if it acts responsibly. This does not mean it will always act
correctly. People make mistakes. The government, being no more than
an aggregate of people, will likewise err. In order to act responsibly, the
government must accept the consequences of its inevitable errors. As
our government realizes this and begins to accept responsibility for its
acts, it will begin to better serve those who created it.
G. Michael Harz*
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